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FORECAST OF MULTIPLE-SECTORAL DECOUPLING OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH ENERGY CONSUMPTION
SUN Han, ZHANG Hongyan, FU Xiaoling
Resources & Industries    2021, 23 (5): 11-20.   DOI: 10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20211014.002
Abstract114)      PDF(pc) (2582KB)(38)       Save
Environmental pollution and energic shortage are worsening as economy grows. Decoupling of China's multiple-sectoral economic growth with energic consumption is key to relieving the pressures on China's energy security and climate and environment. This paper uses Tapio decoupling model and LEAP system to forecast the decoupling of China's sectoral production with energic consumption under benchmark and outlook scenarios on the basis of production and energic consumption information of 8 sectors in 1999 to 2017. Results show that the decoupling is well in the first industry, probably to reach a strong decoupling (ΔG>0, ΔE<0, δ<0), likely to reach a strong decoupling in the second industry, but declining (ΔG<0, ΔE<0, 0.8≤δ≤1.2) in mining, electricity, gas and supply industries under the reference background, fluctuating between strong and weak decoupling in manufacturing and building sectors, which is estimated to be improving. The third industry displays a weak decoupling under the outlook except the storage and posting industries with an expanding connection (ΔG>0, ΔE>0, 0.8≤δ≤1.2) under the reference and outlook. This paper presents suggestion for policy makers to focus on the third industry, especially on transportation, storage and positing industries of large potential in improving energic use structure and technical innovation.
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EVOLUTIONAL GAMING RESEARCH OF STAKEHOLDERS BEHAVIOR IN WATER ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE PPP PROJECTS
FU Xiaoling, ZHAI Ziyu
Resources & Industries    2021, 23 (3): 70-78.   DOI: 10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20210201.001
Abstract88)         PDF(mobile) (1475KB)(6)    Save

The gaming behaviors between governments and investors in water environmental governance PPP projects will impact the effectiveness. This paper, aiming at their cooperating mechanism, establishes an evolutional gaming model between government and investors in water environmental governance based on a payment matrix on the basis of government (administrating or not) and investors (cooperative or opportunistic), and discusses their evolutional stability strategy, and reveals the impacts of behaviors on ideal stable strategy (administrating and cooperative). Cases are studied by means of Matlab software. 

Their evolutional gaming tends to reach win\|win when governments and investors decrease their costs, increase their gains and governments strictly reward or punish the investors. This paper presents suggestions on improving supervision system, optimizing rewarding / punishing mechanism and boosting technical innovation favorable for water environmental governance PPP projects, so as to increase their cooperative benefits. 
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